T he summer of 2007 marked the beginning of the worst economic downturn in U.S. history since the Great Depression. Economic deterioration eventually spread. It took only a few months for the international economy to experience a similar downturn. This crisis marked the onset of a new …nancial and economic order, thrusting monetary and …scal authorities into unfamiliar territory. The largely unforeseen episode impelled central banks and governments throughout the world to take unprecedented measures to prop up their economies at a time when they had a limited understanding of the full e¤ects of their actions.
With many issues still to be addressed, virtually every developed country has o¢ cially emerged from recession. 1 The atypical nature of this recession serves as a unique learning experience. The challenge now is to draw some lessons that may be applied in future episodes. One interesting subject in this regard is the detection of early recessionary signs. The crisis emerged and ended largely unforeseen, even by professional forecasters. This research is motivated by empirical evidence suggesting that signs predicting the end of the U.S. recession may have appeared in the U.S. economy as early as the …rst quarter of 2009. With newly released data on recession dates, we look at the term-structure literature in an attempt to decipher early recessionary signs in the U.S. and other developed countries. 2 With data as they existed in March-April 2009-which we believe marked the turning point in the recession-we de…ne an extended term-structure model capable of a-priori predicting the end of the recession in the U.S. and other developed economies. The probability of recession is de…ned as a function of the traditional yield spread, plus a forward-looking measure of growth expectations, namely the output gap growth spread. Exploring one step further, we test recent evidence suggesting that movements in U.S. business cycles have a delayed e¤ect on other countries'economic ‡uctuations, making their recession probabilities additionally dependent on the probabilities of recession in the U.S. We carry out the analysis for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. with data as they existed in March-April 2009.
Our results show that 1) the end of recession in the U.S. could have indeed been anticipated as early as April 2009 had the contemporaneous information been correctly (or in a timely manner) interpreted, and 2) that other countries'recessionary patterns, which are shown to be dependent on the probability of recession in the U.S., could have been foreseen then as well. Our extended term-structure models proved to be e¤ective in the detection of turning points, which could eventually enable policymakers and governments everywhere to act proactively in the face of adverse economic conditions. Section 1 presents anecdotal evidence suggesting that the turning point of the economic downturn became evident in March-April 2009 but was underestimated by most professional forecasters. The next section details the extended term-structure model for the U.S., which, apart from using the customary yield spread, introduces a forward-looking measure representing the output gap growth spread. This section also presents the in-sample and out-of-sample results for the probability of recession in the U.S. Section 3 tests how well this extended term structure works for other countries and compares performance when the functional form additionally depends on current and lagged U.S. recession probabilities. Section 4 poses policy relevance questions.
MOTIVATION: DID WE MISREAD THE SIGNALS IN SPRING 2009?
After a few quarters of an unprecedented global economic contraction, surprising signs started to emerge in the U.S. in March 2009 that suggested the rate of output decline had moderated. Unlike they did in the rest of the world, …nancial conditions somewhat improved in the U.S. and con…dence indicators (for the …rst time in months) reported levels slightly greater than anticipated. Despite the moderate improvement in some important indicators, few forecasters felt con…dent declaring that the end of the recession was in sight.
The Goldman Sachs Financial Stress Index (FSI) in March was the …rst indicator suggesting a sizable improvement in market conditions in the U.S., with economic data indicating a stabilization of the cycle. Shortly thereafter, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and American Bankers Association's Economic Advisory Committee (EAC) both issued forecasts considered optimistic at the time. The OECD expected the U.S. resurgence to begin with ‡at growth in third quarter 2009. The EAC projected that the U.S. economy would emerge from recession by late summer 2009, with economic activity increasing 0.5 percent between July and September. We now know that the EAC's upbeat forecast fell short of actual growth (2.3 percent).
April's data proved slightly more compelling, convincing a few more forecasters that the turning point may have been reached. That month, the U.S. Blue Chip's leading indicator jumped into positive territory (Figure 1 ) at the same time Consensus Forecasts stabilized and the pace of negative growth receded ( Figure   1 The o¢ cial recession dates used in this paper are based on NBER for the U.S. and ECRI for other countries. In retrospect, we see that the signs must have been there, but the pessimism in the economic status quo brought about by a recessionary environment may have caused forecasters to undershoot, even in the face of the March-April news. It is now clear that we were closer to the end of the U.S. recessionary cycle than most of them had anticipated.
Furthermore, if the U.S. exerts a lagged in ‡uence over other countries'economic ‡uctuations, as recent literature suggests, these early recovery signs in the U.S. might have allowed policymakers in other countries to act proactively. The motivation behind this research was the possibility that the incipient green shoots in March-April contained information that was not correctly or timely interpreted but nonetheless impacted the real economy.
FORECASTING RECESSION PROBABILITIES FOR THE U.S.
De…ning a Term-Structure Model for the U.S.
The yield curve describes the relationship between short-and long-term interest rates (i.e., the term spread). The shape and slope of the curve are closely scrutinized because empirical studies have proven their connection to expectations of future interest rates and economic activity (Dueker 1997; Estrella and Hardouvelis 1991; Mishkin 1997, 1998; Estrella and Trubin 2006; Kozicki 1997) . In general, the ‡attening of the curve is indicative of lower future spot-rate expectations, which are usually related to an expected worsening of future economic conditions. The steeper the slope, the slower the expected growth in real output, and vice versa. Consequently, an inverted yield curve-in which shorter-term yields are higher than longer-term yields-is largely associated with future recessions. Anecdotal evidence seems to corroborate this relationship. In nine out of the last ten U.S. recessions, an inverted yield curve has preceded a downturn.
There are several theoretical approaches explaining the relationship between the yield curve and future economic activity. The consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) (Campbell and Cochrane 1999) , the Real Business Cycle Theory (RBC) (Kydland and Prescott 1988) , and the Keynesian IS-LM models (Estrella and Hardouvelis 1991) all seem to be consistent with the observed predictability of the yield curve. 3 However, these and other explanations have proven ‡awed. As of today, no standard theoretical approach exists to relate the yield curve to forecasts of future economic activity, and it is not clear whether the yield curve signals expectations of monetary policy alone, information about future economic conditions, or both (Kozicki 1997) . 4 The transmission channels have not been clearly identi…ed, and the curve's close association with subsequent changes in production, consumption, investment, and other components of real GDP remains purely empirical. 5 While the theoretical underpinnings of the yield curve as a leading indicator are a matter of debate, the empirical evidence is hard to refute. The curve is a de facto leading indicator, and its predictive power for in-sample and out-of-sample performance has empirically surpassed most of the variables typically used as predictors of the U.S. economy (Estrella and Mishkin 1998) , including leading indicators and survey forecasts (Estrella and Hardouvelis 1991; Dueker 1997) . 6 Its predictive value is well-recognized by public and private forecasters in the U.S. 7 The empirical relationship between future production rates and the current slope of the yield curve seems to be stronger when the economy is close to or in recessionary mode (Estrella and Hardouvelis 1991) . This asymmetry has suggested that the yield curve may be a better predictor of a binary variable that indicates either the presence or absence of recession. While some evidence indicates that the binary models may overpredict recession results (Chauvet and Potter 2005) , research has also shown them to be more e¤ective and stable than continuous models (Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich 2003) . Hence, a great deal of related research has been conducted with probabilistic models such as logit or probit (Stock and Watson 1989; Estrella and Mishkin 1998) . 8 However, this type of literature is mainly focused on predicting recessions rather than considering quantitative measures of future economic activity.
Because the focus of this section is to forecast recessions in the U.S., we use this trend of research to de…ne our base model. Speci…cally, we apply a probit model, which has proven to be very successful and stable with U.S. data. We extend the probability of recession-traditionally de…ned as a function of the yield spread exclusively-to make it dependent on a forward-looking measure of growth expectations, namely the output gap growth-rate spread.
The inclusion of the output gap growth-rate-spread term is an important addition to the traditional term-structure models and, more generally, to the overall analysis of the yield curve as a leading indicator. Several hypotheses argue that the yield spread's predictive power for real growth derives from the forwardlooking information it contains, and most of the intuition behind such power relies upon the expectations hypothesis.
The general argument is that agents incorporate current expectations about the future state of the economy into current asset prices. However, a great deal of vagueness is associated with the composition and fabrication of these expectations. 9 There is evidence that the predictive power of the yield spread comes from multiple channels -which are often hard to identify-and not exclusively from expectations about the future state of the economy (Estrella and Trubin 2006) . By including the output gap growth-rate spread, we separate the e¤ects of expectations of future output growth from other unidenti…ed in ‡uences. 10 Finally, we allow di¤erent lag speci…cations in order to obtain some information on the delay with which the yield spread or the output gap spread a¤ects the probability of recession in the U.S. Our general extended probit representation is de…ned as: P r(U:S:Recession) t+h = F (C; dr t; dr t 1; dr t 6; dr t 12 ; dg t; dg t 1; dg t 6; dg t 12 ),
where P r(U:S:Recession) t+h -the probability of recession h months ahead of the current month t-is a (dummy) variable equal to 1 when the month is identi…ed as recessionary by the NBER, 11 and zero otherwise, C is a constant term, dr is the yield spread, and dg is the output gap growth-rate spread. 12 The yield spread (dr) is de…ned as the monthly di¤erence between the U.S. government bond yield ten years and over (our proxy for long-term interest rates) and three-month certi…cates of deposit (our proxy for short-term rates) as posted in the OECD main economic indicators online database. 13 The output gap growth-rate spread (dg) represents the monthly di¤erence between the one-year-ahead and current annualized real growth rates. 14 To calculate this, we pull the nonannualized quarter-over-quarter real GDP growth rate from the OECD Main Economic Indicators'National Accounts for second quarter 1984 to fourth quarter 2008 (the last quarter available in March 2009) and the annualized Consensus Forecasts quarterover-quarter expected real GDP growth rate for …rst-through fourth-quarter 2009. 15 To merge the two 1 0 A well-de…ned characterization of expectations of future real growth is increasingly important in the term-structure literature. Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006), for instance, build a dynamic model for GDP growth and yields that completely characterizes expectations of GDP. Orphanides and van Norden (2005) show evidence regarding the value of the output gap growth rate as a reliable predictor of the real economy, especially in forecasting exercises. And other authors, including Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (forthcoming), have found that replacing in ‡ation or output gaps with their forecasts provides better descriptions of historical policy. 1 1 The o¢ cial NBER recession dates can be found at www.nber.org/cycles.html. 1 2 We recognize that some overlap may occur with the coe¢ cient of the yield spread (speci…cally its twelfth lagged value), picking up some of the e¤ects of the output gap growth spread, which represents year-ahead expectations. However, such overlap should be very low in times of abnormally high risk aversion or panic, generally present in recessionary situations. 1 3 Data can be obtained from the OECD website (www.oecd.org).
1 4 A similar de…nition is used in Orphanides and van Norden (2005) . In this article, the authors …nd that forecast-based variables better describe the evolution of monetary policy in the U.S. (i.e., the Taylor rule). Particularly relevant for our work is their forward-looking output gap characterization, de…ned as a year-ahead growth forecast relative to potential.
1 5 The one-year-ahead and current annualized real growth rates can be pulled from the OECD website (www.oecd.org). The quarterly output gap data can be obtained from the March 9, 2009, Consensus Forecast survey. datasets, we annualize the OECD data and form a single compatible quarterly data series, from which we de…ne a quarterly output gap growth rate as:
where (GDP gr ) n is the annualized quarterly real growth rate. 16 We then do a monthly frequency conversion of dg n following Levin and Taylor (forthcoming) that de…nes the monthly output gap growth rate, dg t , used in (1). 17 
In-Sample Results
We use (1) to determine the probability that the U.S. is in recession, based on data from January 1991 to March 2009 as it existed in April 2009. Various speci…cations were considered, with the objective of comparing performance. Table 1 presents the in-sample results for the most signi…cant model de…nitions considered: All the models seem to be fairly good representations of the probability of recession in the U.S., with the McFadden R-squared (MFR) terms …tting between 71 and 82 percent of the data. 18 However, high p values in current dr in models 1, 2, and 3 indicate that this variable may not belong in the equation. The same is true for the sixth and twelfth lags of dg in models 1 and 2. This may suggest that the yield spread takes longer than the growth rate in the output gap to show in the probability of recession. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 The signs of the coe¢ cients seem consistent. In all the models, the yield spread's coe¢ cient is positive in the …rst lag and negative in the sixth and twelfth lags. A normal yield curve (positive dr) in the current period would be associated with a future increase in real economic activity, which would intrinsically add to the probability of contemporary recession. Six or twelve months ahead, these expectations would have had time to materialize, inversing their e¤ects on the probability of recession. It is important to notice that this reversion more than overturns the original impact on the probability of recession.
Similarly, for the output gap growth-rate spread (dg), a positive value would indicate that one-yearahead growth is expected to be stronger than the present-day rate, adding to the current probability of recession. For this variable, we see that the e¤ects on the probability of recession partially dissipate in one month as some of these expectations materialize, and they become irrelevant six and twelve months later. It is important to notice that the immediate e¤ect of dg is rather large in all the models, but it decreases by at least half in the following month. This suggests that, as in the case of the yield spread, economic agents tend to overestimate the direction of the future economy, only to correct once new information is available.
To formally choose the best speci…cation, we primarily looked at the highest MFR values and the lowest values for the Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criterion, which are both especially suited for binary model settings. For completeness, we also looked at the lowest values of the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC, respectively). 19 From the seven models analyzed, the highest MFR values corresponded to model 1, closely followed by models 2, 3, and 4 (all above 81 percent). However, we chose model 4 as the best representation because it had signi…cantly lower values for the HQ, AIC, and BIC criteria and because all its variables were signi…cant, which was not the case in the other models with high-…tting values. We compared the predictions (or …tted values) obtained from model 4 with the o¢ cial NBER recession dates. We obtained an almost perfect in-sample …t (Figure 3 ), identifying the last three recessions with remarkable precision.
Out-of-Sample Forecasts
Model 4, our best representation of actual NBER recessions, was used to forecast out-of-sample the probabilities of recession in the U.S., with predictive horizons ranging from one to nine months (h = 1:::9). The coe¢ cients estimated for each horizon, along with the respective p values, are presented in Table 2 . The actual probabilities of recession, obtained by plugging in the corresponding coe¢ cients for horizons h = 1:::9 into the last data point available, are presented in Figure 4 . The forecasts, calculated with data as they existed in April 2009, show a steep reduction in the probability of recession from June to July, with the probabilities virtually dissipating by August-September. This coincides with the NBER's subsequent announcements. These results suggest that our extended term structure could be a good predictor of the U.S. real economy because it anticipated the end of the U.S. recession as early as the beginning of second quarter 2009. Our model's success may owe to the fact that both the yield spread and the output gap growth spread contain forward-looking information. Theory suggests that recession indicators produced by the yield curve in its original form may signi…cantly precede those produced by other indicators. Adding another explicitly forward-looking variable might have signaled recessions earlier (and presumably more accurately) than traditional yield curve models used by most professional forecasters. 
FORECASTING RECESSION PROBABILITIES FOR OTHER COUNTRIES
In the previous section, we looked into the term structure as a predictor of real economic activity and de…ned a model capable of a-priori predictions of U.S. recession probabilities. We now extend the analysis to other developed economies, an appealing approach given the limited evidence on the usefulness of the yield spread as a predictor of real economic activity outside the U.S. 20 Capitalizing on the U.S. forecasts obtained in the previous section, we use our extended term-structure framework to test recent evidence suggesting that movements in U.S. business cycles have a delayed e¤ect on other countries'economic ‡uctuations (Fernandez and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy 2010) . 21 If this were true, the probability of recession in other countries would depend not only on those nations'own yield and output gapgrowth spreads but possibly on the probabilities of recession in the U.S. This possibility is worth exploring because it seems consistent with what occurred in the last recession. First, we know that the earliest signs foretelling the crisis emerged in the U.S. and extended throughout the world. Second, the results of our U.S. forecasting exercise suggest that real signs of recovery surfaced in this country earlier than anywhere else. 22 Accordingly, our exercise begins with the selection of the best characterization of the probability of recession for country i, F i , where F i depends exclusively on the yield spread and output growth rate (and lags). We then de…ne F U:S: i as the best characterization when the functional form additionally depends on current and lagged U.S. recession probabilities (as obtained in the previous section). We carry out the analysis for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K., for which we compare performance among F i and F U:S: i . 23 Due to availability, the data used in this section range from August 1992 to March 2009. The probit de…nitions for the probability of recession in country i at time t, with and without the U.S. probability of recession, are: where P r(Rec) i t+h is the probability of recession in country i, h periods ahead of month t. It is represented by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is said to be in recession according to ECRI, and zero otherwise. 24 The yield spread and output gap growth spread for country i at month t are represented by dr i t and dg i , respectively, which, for consistency, are estimated with the same methods and sources used for the U.S. In (3), usf 4 i t and lags denote the U.S. probability of recession, as obtained in the previous section for model 4, our preferred speci…cation. For consistency, we test the …rst, sixth, and twelfth lagged values for all the variables.
F i and F U:S:
i are selected from a number of lag combinations based on the highest MFR values and the lowest HQ, AIC, and BIC information criteria. As we did with the U.S., when two or more alternative speci…cations had fairly close …tness and information criteria values, we gave preference to those functional forms in which the explanatory variables had the best signi…cance levels (i.e., the lowest p values). Our selected functional forms and the corresponding in-sample results are presented in Table 3 . The results for F i show a relatively good …t, with MFR values going from 23 percent for Germany to above 70 percent for Italy, the U.K., and Canada. The information criteria values are stronger for Canada and the U.K. (which lie within the range of values obtained for the U.S.) and weaker in Germany and Japan. We also see that all the variables are highly signi…cant, with zero p values virtually everywhere. Looking at the signs of the coe¢ cients, we see that positive values for current yield spread and output gap growth spread are generally associated with expectations of more favorable economic conditions in the future, implicitly adding to the probability of recession at present. Overall, negative coe¢ cients are seen in later periods, when more information becomes available and the impact of the original expectations is corrected. Based on the results for F i , we may conclude that agents tend to overestimate the future state of the economy, only to correct once additional information becomes available. The opposite seems to be true for Japan, which may be attributable to the country's comparatively low interest rate structure.
The results for F U:S: i
show that the in ‡uence of the U.S. is signi…cant in the probability of recession in other countries. Without exception, the inclusion of U.S. probabilities of recession substantially increases the goodness of …t and decreases the information criteria. The F U:S:
i MFR values'increase with respect to F i is especially noticeable for Germany (0.448 from 0.226) and Japan (0.555 from 0.339). But they are also important for Italy (0.796 from 0.715), the U.K. (0.865 from 0.712), and Canada (0.800 from 0.725). While information criteria decrease for all, the decline is especially noticeable for Germany and Japan.
The signs of the coe¢ cients and the signi…cance levels are consistent with those obtained from the F i calculations. On one hand, we see positive values for current yield spread and output gap growth rates and negative values for their lagged coe¢ cients. On the other hand, we see zero p values virtually everywhere, suggesting that the regressors belong in the equation. Japan, a country with a very di¤erent interest and in ‡ation structure, responds in the opposite direction regarding the yield spread. For this country, an increase in interest rates generally overshoots a decrease in the current probability of recession, only to correct in later periods.
Without exception, all the countries depend on lagged values of U.S. recession probabilities, which adds to the evidence presented in Fernandez and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2010) . This is signi…cant because recognizing recessionary signs early on in the U.S. could enable economic agents and monetary authorities across the world to respond preemptively, possibly attenuating the e¤ects of an eventual economic downturn.
The predictions (or …tted values, h = 0) obtained from F U:S:
i are compared with the latest o¢ cial business-cycle peak and trough dates of the ECRI. We use the institute's dates available as of September 23, 2010, in assessing our forecasts. We then forecast the out-of-sample probabilities of recession for horizons h = 1 : : : 15. Data availability and the speci…c functional-form de…nitions determine each country's forecasting dates. Accordingly, the out-of-sample forecasts go from March 2009 to May 2010 for Italy and Japan, from April 2009 to June 2010 for France and Germany, and from April 2009 to December 2010 for the U.K. and Canada. The functional-form de…nitions for these last two countries allow us to use the six-steps-ahead probabilities of recession for the U.S. obtained in the previous section, which extends the forecast by six months. For these countries, we …t the model for h = 0 and immediately obtain the forecasts of recession probabilities six periods ahead without doing direct forecasts. The direct forecast begins in October 2009 (h = 1) and ends in December 2010 (h = 15).
Figures 5 to 10 plot the in-sample and out-of-sample recession forecasts (h = 0 : : : 15) against the most up-to-date business-cycle peak and trough dates as published by the ECRI in March 2011. The shaded area at the end shows the beginning of the out-of-sample exercise. The in-sample …t is rather accurate, identifying entry and exit recession points with signi…cant precision. The path of the out-of-sample forecasts largely coincides with that of the ECRI dates.
Looking at countries independently, we see that for Italy, our in-sample forecast portrays remarkably well the beginning of the last recession, and the out-of-sample forecast depicts accurately the sharp decrease in recession probabilities and the eventual end of recession. In the case of France, our forecast pattern clearly increases with the presence of recessions. That is true for the last two recessions, but while our in-sample forecast begins in August 1993 after the 1992-93 recession in France, we see that the probabilities move toward zero with the end of the ECRI-dated recession. The out-of-sample forecast's turning point clearly coincides with the end of the downturn. In the last months of the forecast, we see that the recession probabilities wiggle a little, but the overall tendency is downward.
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The case of Japan is very interesting because our model clearly depicts the country's last three recessions with remarkable accuracy. While we don't have data before August 1992, the forecast pattern also seems to be consistent with the 1992-93 recession according to ECRI. The out-of-sample forecast's turning point clearly coincides with the end of recession according to ECRI.
The in-sample …t for Germany illustrates the beginning of the country's last two big recessions, with a sharp increase in the probabilities of recession. For the long 2001-03 recession, we observe an apparent turning point around May 2002 that fuels another sharp increase in recession probabilities before the close of the recession. Our model picks up this fact remarkably well. The out-of-sample forecast also coincides with a turning point (end of recession) preceding a sharp decline in the probabilities of recession.
In the U.K., our model picks a false positive in 2001-02 but depicts remarkably well the beginning of the most recent recession. The out-of-sample forecast also presents an accurate path for the end of recession. The case of Canada is very similar to that of the U.K., with a false positive in 2001-02 but a fairly precise description of the most recent recession. Particularly precise is our out-of-sample forecast that detects the end of the Canadian recession.
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We looked into the term structure to de…ne a model that represents the NBER recession dates and used this model to forecast the probabilities of recession in the U.S. Our results suggest that the end of the most recent U.S. recession could have been forecast as early as April 2009, when the …rst green shoots emerged in the U.S. data. The term-structure version we applied proved to be a good predictor of the U.S. real economy, allowing us to signal recessions earlier (and presumably more accurately) than traditional term-structure models do. The U.S. recession indicators produced by our model, which combines the yield spread with forward-looking growth expectations (the output gap growth spread), seem to have signi…cantly preceded those used by most professional forecasters.
Similarly, the model we de…ned to predict the probabilities of recession in other countries seems to have produced recession indicators earlier than those used by most international forecasters. We …nd that most of the a-posteriori o¢ cial releases for the countries included in the analysis could have been forecast as early as April 2009. Furthermore, our …ndings show evidence supporting Fernandez and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy's 2010 claims that other countries'economic ‡uctuations are strongly tied to past economic conditions in the U.S.
These results highlight two important issues. First, they add to the evidence of the yield curve as a predictor of economic activity that may be useful to policymakers, market participants, and economic researchers. And second, they corroborate the signi…cance of U.S. economic in ‡uence on the rest of the world. Given the lagged U.S. in ‡uence, the results also suggest that other countries may bene…t from incorporating some U.S. economic indicators or monetary policy decisions into their forecasts.
